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Abstract
Background: The Norwegian hospital reform of 2002 was an attempt to make restructuring of
hospitals easier by removing politicians from the decision-making processes. To facilitate changes
seen as necessary but politically difficult, the central state took over ownership of the hospitals and
stripped the county politicians of what had been their main responsibility for decades. This meant
that decisions regarding hospital structure and organization were now being taken by professional
administrators and not by politically elected representatives. The question raised here is whether
this has had any effect on the speed of restructuring of the hospital sector.
Method: The empirical part is a case study of the restructuring process in Innlandet Hospital Trust
(IHT), which was one of the largest enterprise established after the hospital reform and where the
vision for restructuring was clearly set. Different sources of qualitative data are used in the analysis.
These include interviews with key actors, observational data and document studies.
Results: The analysis demonstrates how the new professional leaders at first acted in accordance
with the intentions of the hospital reform, but soon chose to avoid the more ambitious plans for
restructuring the hospital structure and in fact reintroduced local politics into the decision-making
process. The analysis further illustrates how local networks and engagement of political
representatives from all levels of government complicated the decision-making process
surrounding local structural reforms. Local political representatives teamed up with other actors
and created powerful networks. At the same time, national politicians had incentives to involve
themselves in the processes as supporters of the status quo.
Conclusion: Because of the incentives that faced political actors and the controversial nature of
major hospital reforms, the removal of local politicians and the centralization of ownership did not
necessarily facilitate reforms in the hospital structure. Keeping politics at an arm's length may
simply be unrealistic and further complicate the politics of local hospital reforms.
Background
Because of a decentralized settlement pattern and great
geographical distances, local hospitals have played an
important role in the provision of specialist health care in
Norway. However, the decentralized hospital structure
may have negative effects on clinical quality [1,2], and it
is generally regarded as costly. The need for structural
changes within the hospital sector was emphasized in sev-
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eral reviews and royal commissions leading up to the
2002 hospital reform, when the central state took over
ownership of the hospitals [3-6]. As underlined in the
report from the royal commission that considered the
central government takeover of hospitals [4], there was a
decision-making problem at the county level because pol-
iticians were required to balance the national goals of an
efficient hospital structure against local political factors.
The effect was "...decisions that lead to low efficiency due
to unnecessary duplication of services and too high differ-
entiation of the emergency capacity" [4].
The need for change in the organization and division of
labor between hospitals was one of the main reasons for
the 2002 reform, although it was not (probably for polit-
ical reasons) explicitly stated in the act transferring own-
ership [7]. However, the reform not only transferred
ownership from 19 counties to the central state. Two
other elements in the reform were of equal importance.
First, hospitals were set up as health enterprises or trusts
and organized within five Regional Health Authorities
(RHA) (enterprises also). Second, both the health enter-
prises and the RHAs were to be governed by boards com-
prising professional members. The Minister of Health,
acting as their general assembliesi, appointed the board
members at the RHA level. This implied that politicians
were no longer represented at the regional and local level
in the health care organization.
The need for restructuring did become explicit, as the
RHAs were to organize their service-producing units or
health enterprises. As demonstrated by Nerland [8], the
goals of higher cost efficiency and higher clinical quality
guided the organizational structure for the health enter-
prises chosen by the RHA. All RHAs concluded that these
goals were best accomplished by organizing hospitals
within large, geographically organized health enterprises
that included, on average, three or four acute hospitals in
addition to psychiatric hospitals and other specialist care
institutions. A reduction in the duplication of services and
increased scale effects were the main arguments for this
choice of organizational structure [8]. Both the reduction
of local political involvement and the move from a (for-
mal) multileveled governance structure to a single level
structure could make restructuring easier. That is, remov-
ing local politicians from structural decisions could also
remove them as opponents of restructuring. By introduc-
ing one formal decision maker, the central state, it was
assumed that gaming between the governmental levels
would be also reduced.
The question asked in this paper is whether the new
organizational model has worked as intended. The 2002
Norwegian hospital reform involved removing local poli-
tics from the decision-making process by transferring
ownership of the hospitals to the state, organizing hospi-
tals as enterprises, and introducing professional board
members. Did this facilitate restructuring of the hospital
sector? Alternatively, did restructuring of the hospital
structure remain as difficult as it was before the central
state took ownership?
The paper commences with a description of the formal
organizational changes that took place as the central state
took over ownership of the hospitals in 2002 and a
description of general trends in the restructuring of hospi-
tals. A theoretical discussion of how the new organiza-
tional model may work follows. The empirical part is a
case study of the restructuring process in Innlandet Hospi-
tal Trust (IHT), which was the largest enterprise estab-
lished after the hospital reform and where the vision for
restructuring was clearly set. In the discussion, I question
whether the "national goal of an efficient hospital struc-
ture", as stated in the commission report that considered
the central government takeover of the hospital sector [4],
really exists.
The Norwegian hospital reform
The primary goals for Norwegian health and hospital pol-
icy over the past 50-60 years has been quality, cost effi-
ciency and equal access for all citizens regardless of
personal resources and place of residence. The means that
have been put to use to achieve these goals has however
varied somewhat more in the same period [8]. In the last
part of the nineties the need for organizational reforms
and improved cost control became increasingly impor-
tant, and a change in ownership and the division of tasks
between the different levels of government was seen by
many as a potential instrument to achieve these goals. The
hospital reform of 2002 was planned, passed and imple-
mented at a remarkable pace after the Norwegian Labour
party came into powerii [9,10].
In 2002, five health regions, which had existed since the
mid 1970s as network organizations between counties,
were upgraded to Regional Health Authorities (RHA). The
RHA were organized as enterprises with the responsibility
of providing hospital care to the inhabitants in their catch-
ments areas, either through hospitals under their own
ownership and control or through contracts with private
providers [7]. Importantly, as county ownership of the
hospitals was removed, local (county) politicians were
also removed. The Minister of Health became the general
assembly of the RHA, each with a board composed of pro-
fessional members from business, academia, and the hos-
pital labor organizations. Decisions concerning
administrative, organizational, and production issues
were decentralized to the RHAs, or even further to the
local hospital trusts, which were organized similarly to the
RHAs and governed by boards composed of professionalBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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members. The political responsibility for the sector was
now placed at a single level of government but, at the
same time, the degree of delegation to nonpolitical actors
was high. In sum the reform therefore also constituted an
attempt to keep politics at arm's length.
By concentrating responsibility for financing and produc-
tion at the central state level, the reformers wanted to
improve the overall governing of the sector. The division
of the responsibility for production and financing
between the counties and the central state was regarded as
an obstacle for good governance in the sector. There were
also other stated goals behind the reform. For instance, in
the act that switched ownership, it is stated that the cabi-
net's ambition is to "combine availability, quality and
care for the patient with a rational resource allocation and
a holistic societal responsibility and leadership" [7]. It is
clear, however, that the main goal behind the reform was
to improve the overall governance of the sector and
reduce problems that arose because of the preexisting
multileveled governing structure within the sector. But the
hospital reform did not deliver as far as the budgetary dis-
cipline in the sector is concerned. As it can be seen from
figure 2iii [11], the deficits in the sector persisted also after
the central state took over ownership
Now, six years after the reform, hospital debts are higher
than ever and the speed of restructuring can hardly be said
to be gathering pace. For example, Huseby and Jensberg
[12] analyzed the effects of the hospital reform on the
degree of centralization of specialized procedures. They
concluded there had been no significant change in the
level of service concentration and that the overall changes
in this area between 1999 and 2005 were low. Another
illustrative case is the number of birth units in the Norwe-
gian health care sector. Birth departments are especially
relevant in this context for two reasons. First, these serv-
ices are costly, and increasing efficiency in this area can
therefore create significant savings for hospitals. Second,
they are one of the most difficult services to centralize
because proximity and traveling distance are important
aspects of the perceived quality of these services. Further,
this is a service that most if not all voters know they them-
selves (or someone in their family) will probably need in
the future. Local reductions and/or restructuring of these
services have also proven to be politically difficult in the
past. Thus, these cases represent something of a "critical
test" for hospital reform. If the new ownership structure
facilitates restructuring, then this is where it will be put to
the test.
Figure 2 shows the number of birth departments in Nor-
way between 1997 and 2006. As indicated, there has been
no dramatic difference between the years prior to the cen-
tral state takeover and the first few years after the takeover.
Indeed, the overall trend is a reduction in the number of
birth units, and this is similar before and after 2002.
Clearly, the change in ownership has not eradicated the
deficits of the sector, nor does it appear that the degree of
local changes in the hospital sector have been as wide-
spread and as significant as the premises underlying the
reform would lead one to expect. The deficits in the sector
did however spur several local reform initiatives. In the
next sections I will present some of the insights that can
be derived from one of the most ambitious reform initia-
tives in the hospital sector. First however, I lay out some
theoretical considerations about why restructuring in the
hospital sector can be politically extremely difficult.
Running deficits (current prices) in NOK million (left axis)  and percent of total revenues (right axis), 2002-2006 Figure 1
Running deficits (current prices) in NOK million (left 
axis) and percent of total revenues (right axis), 2002-
2006.
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The politics of restructuring hospitals
The politics of restructuring hospital services have much
in common with "pork barrel" politics, which describes
the political process of "giving" specific projects to specific
areas in return for electoral rewards [13,14]. Politicians
who succeed in such a game are often rewarded by
(re)election. However, in the restructuring of hospitals,
the question is not only about the geographic locality
rewarded with investment, but also about the sites that are
closed. Such issues are extremely controversial locally. The
demands placed on their elected politicians from local
voters to retain the status quo are high and the politicians
have a strong incentive to engage in the processes.
Although a few "unpopular" changes in hospital structure
took place during the period of county ownership [15],
the problem spelled out and referred to in the introduc-
tion was that restructuring was sluggish.
From multilevel to single level governance
As the central state took over ownership of the hospitals,
local political actors no longer played a formal role in
decisions on the restructuring of hospital services. This
could facilitate hospital restructuring as described earlier.
However, the central state is also governed by politicians
and there is no a priori reason to believe that their motives
differ considerably from county politicians. As discussed
in Strøm [16], politicians' motives can be pinned to pol-
icy, positions, and votes (reelection), with reelection
being particularly important [17]. In health politics, this
has the potential to block unpopular reforms. An interest-
ing description of this in the British healthcare system is
given by Enthoven [18].
MPs and ministers cheerfully use the NHS as a bundle
of gifts to give voters: a new hospital here, stopping
those dreadful bureaucrats from closing one down
there, winter money here and reductions in waiting
lists there. All this is well and democratic, but it isn't
the same as a relentless and systematic effort to maxi-
mize health gain for money or systematically improv-
ing customer service, and indeed may be the opposite.
Two mechanisms in the new hospital organization were
intended to hinder political intervention in the decision-
making process. First, through the organization of five
RHAs with the Minister of Health as the general assembly,
politicians were to govern "at a distance" and concentrate
on strategic management. Second, the introduction of
boards composed of professional members involved the
introduction of actors that did not need to fear electoral
retaliation if their policies and decisions were not in
accordance with the voters' preferences. Consequently,
the trade-off between the national goals of an efficient
hospital structure and local demand for a decentralized
hospital structure, earlier described as a difficult decision-
making problem at the county level [4], could now be
resolved. This rests, however, on two important premises:
first, that the governing process follows the formal hierar-
chical structure of the sector, and second, that removing
politicians formally from the decision-making process
reduces their involvement.
Local protesters and vote-seeking politicians
However, power and influence over the outcomes of the
decision-making process may be more complex than a
formal focus on roles and authority would suggest. Other
arenas exist, power does not reduce to formal authority
alone, and a wide array of actors both within and outside
the political sphere interact through policy. This is the key
description given in the multilevel governance literature
[19,20]. The growing interdependence of governments at
different levels as well as between governments and non-
governmental actors creates complex policy processes.
This refers to the vertical interaction between different lev-
els of government and to the horizontal interaction
between governmental actors and actors outside the gov-
ernmental system.
The relationship between the central state, subnational
governments, and nonelected agencies is therefore far
more complex than presumed by a formal organizational
structure. Local authorities are working alongside other
agencies to the extent that one can argue for a change from
"local government" to "local governance" [21-23]. Thus,
we can expect that actors and networks outside the hospi-
tals and the RHA will attempt to influence their decisions.
According to Clark [24], local parties can serve a function
outside the formal political arena by providing what can
be described as "problem-solving networks" [24,25]. The
local party branches can have an ombudsman function
and assist local voters in voicing their preferences. A result
can also be that close ties to local interest groups are estab-
lished [24,26]. To see how this works, we need to consider
the preferences of the political actors.
Assuming that politicians at all levels of government have
votes and reelection as their primary goals [17,27], they
are strongly motivated to intervene in unpopular attempts
at local reform. Unpopular changes in the hospital struc-
ture are highly visible,iv and create strong local demand
for influence over the policy process. Local voters have no
reason to support cutbacks in their local area as the poten-
tial benefit of cutbacks (a less costly hospital structure) is
distributed at the national level, while the real or per-
ceived costs (in the form of reduced services) are local.
Blocking unpopular reform attempts is therefore valuable
to political actors because there are few local opponents to
this resistance, and local votes are important for both
renomination and reelection. Thus, politicians at all levels
have an incentive to accommodate the wishes of localBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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protest groups. This provides incentives for local and
county politicians to join protest groups and networks,
and for politicians at the national level to preventv unpop-
ular local reforms.
Consequently, it is difficult to see if anyone actually ben-
efits from standing firm against local protests. In the long
run, the premise behind the stated need of reforms is, of
course, that everyone will benefit from increasing the
overall efficiency of the sector as well as possibly increas-
ing the quality of the care in some instances. In the short
run, however, users/citizens observe reductions in prox-
imity (and therefore increased traveling time) as impor-
tant indicators of quality. The historic surplus of the
national budget also means that any perceived require-
ment for cost cuts is not clear. Consequently, voters place
less value on the possible long-term benefits from reform-
ing and centralizing the hospital sector than on any clear
and tangible short term costs. This also means that the
possible political benefits for a politician by standing firm
against protests in order to create balanced budgets is far
lower than the benefits from complying with the protest-
ers' demands. Furthermore, whereas the instructions sent
to the RHA during the budgetary process in relation to the
demand for budgetary balance and cost cuts are the results
of plenary processes, local protests are more likely to
engage members of parliament (MP) and other politicians
from the area in question and not others. In any case, MPs
from other areas face few incentives to safeguard the long-
term perspective against the short-term demands of local
protesters and politicians.
Methods
Several different types of data were gathered and are put to
use in this article. I followed the development in the trust
in the period that is analyzed here. This included observ-
ing a meeting between the leadership of the trust and local
politicians, a group interview with the leadership of the
trust and an interview with one of the primary actors in
the local protest movement. Furthermore both the Minis-
ter of Health and an MP from the opposition were asked
about the reform process in the innland area in interviews.
Various documents are also used as sources. These include
local (and national) newspapers, transcripts from meet-
ings in Parliament and meetings in the trust and tran-
scripts from meetings in the "society panel". The
methodological strategy which is put to use in the analysis
is based on triangulation [28], where the basic idea is to
strengthen the validity of the conclusions that are drawn
by using multiple sources of evidence.
The data gathered and the analysis techniques used are a
result of the object that is being studied and the depend-
ent variable. Understanding the politics of a local reform
process such as this requires data that can give sufficient
depth and detail, and this is best achieved through the use
of qualitative data. Clearly, some quantitative material
can provide important background information, but on
their own they cannot furnish the basis for gathering suf-
ficient information about the dependent variable. Case
studies and qualitative material in general, do however
make empirical generalization highly problematicvi [29-
33]. Unlike extensive studies with a large N it is not possi-
ble to specify the degree of uncertainty that is present
when generalizing the findings. Furthermore, while the
conclusions drawn from statistical analysis of datasets can
easily be repeated by other scientists, this is not always
possible in studies that rely on qualitative data material.
As pointed out by Stake [29] a "case study" draws atten-
tion to what can be learned from a single case, and the
goal of the study is to "...optimize understanding of the
case rather then generalization beyond". While under-
standing the political process described here does not nec-
essarily give valid grounds for empirical generalization,
close study can give an interesting and valuable insight
into the politics of local restructuring. This may again pro-
vide a basis for generating hypotheses in later research and
may yield important contextual information. A single case
study such as this is therefore best suited for answering
"how" and "why" questions, not for rejecting hypotheses
about causal relationships between different variables.
In gathering data from the Innlandet Hospital Trust, I fol-
lowed the Trust closely over a period of three years. The
challenge in this part of the data collection process was to
maintain a close view in order to acquire a rich under-
standing of the processes but at the same time to keep the
necessary distance from the actors involved in the process
in order to avoid unwanted influence in either direction.
The fact that the Trust partially financed the work that is
presented here made keeping a distance between the
researcher and the research subjects even more important.
This has, however, not influenced any of the conclusions
that are drawn in this article.
Results
Case study of a restructuring process
In 2002, Health East RHA was established as one of the
five regional health authorities.vii During the first year of
service, Health East RHA established a local organization
consisting of sevenviii hospital trusts with defined catch-
ment areas. In addition, contracts with private service pro-
ducers, including two private nonprofit hospitals
(Diakonhjemmet and Lovisenberg), were established
with their own defined catchment areas. One of the seven
health trusts was Innlandet Hospital Trust (IHT), which
had a catchment population of about 390,000 citizens
and covered an area of 53,200 km2. IHT included hospi-
tals from two former counties, Hedmark and Oppland,BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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comprising six acute hospitals (county in parentheses):
Gjøvik (Oppland), Lillehammer (Oppland), Kongsvinger
(Hedmark), Elverum (Hedmark), Hamar (Hedmark), and
Tynset (Hedmark). The largest proportion of the popula-
tion was situated around Lake Mjøsa, which also divides
the major cities and the main hospitals in the two coun-
ties. From 1985, a bridge across Mjøsa replaced the ferry
and reduced travel time between the main cities (Lille-
hammer, Gjøvik, and Hamar) to approximately 30-35
minutes.
The main ambition of the IHT was to increase coordina-
tion between the largest hospitals, located in Lilleham-
mer, Gjøvik, Hamar, and Elverum (see the map in Figure
3, which highlights the main hospitals with larger circles).
As one of the informants in a study by S. Nerland [8]
observes:
The motive was the situation around Lake Mjøsa.
Attempts to coordinate across the county borders have
been made for decades, but it was not possible under
the old ownership. In 2002, we saw the outline of the
same problem occurring between the hospitals.ix
Gathering all the hospitals in one trust was a deliber-
ate organizational strategy.
Although not explicitly stated, it is believed that the idea
of establishing one large hospital trust for the Lake Mjøsa
region had support among key players in the Health East
RHA that had its main office in Hamar, one of the cities in
the catchment area for the IHT. For the maternity care
services in the area, the Eastern RHA stated that "duplica-
tion of supply" was to be minimized, and "efficiency
enhancing measures" were to be implemented. It was also
stated "...decentralized units shall in principle be coordi-
nated to strengthen the professional environments, take
advantage of infrastructure, and increase the unit's robust-
ness" [34]. I will structure the empirical description of the
restructuring of health services in the IHT into two phases:
-- a first phase (2003), in which the main goal was to
merge similar departments from two or three hospitals
into a single department located at a specific hospital;
and
-- a second phase (2004-2006), in which the main
goal was to plan the future structure of the acute hos-
pitals.
All of the data used in this presentation are qualitative. I
followed the development of the trust over the period
2004-2006, and interviewed both the leadership group in
the trust and one of the primary initiative takers behind
the local protest movement in Gjøvik. In addition, I
observed two meetings in the "samfunnspanel", and ques-
tioned both the former Minister of Health and an MP
from the opposition about the process in interviews. Not
all of the information gathered is included directly in the
article, but it has served as important background infor-
mation. In addition to these sources, local newspapersx
provide sources for quotes and information.
The first phase: The vision of a functional organization
In the first phase, the IHT made plans to restructure hos-
pital services grounded in a model of functional organiza-
tion. The process leading to this proposal had been carried
out without any involvement from local political actors,
and the board meetings had been closed to the public.
Although the proposal did not suggest closing down any
acute hospitals, it was clear to all that the outcome of the
process could lead to the centralization of healthcare serv-
ices and longer travel distances, as not all hospitals in the
future would supply all services.
The strongest reactions were observed in the city of Gjø-
vik. The maternity ward at Gjøvik hospital was to be
closed and moved to Lillehammer where a new "women
and children's clinic" was planned. A movement to save
the maternity care unit in Gjøvik was soon established fol-
lowing initiatives by employees at Gjøvik hospital, local
politicians, and trade union representatives. These actors
Hospital units in the Innlandet Hospital Trust Figure 3
Hospital units in the Innlandet Hospital Trust.  Source: 
http://www.sykehuset-innlandet.no.BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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then began to put their organizational and political affili-
ations to use. According to the founder of what was to
become a protest movement to save the maternity ward in
Gjøvik,xi employees at Gjøvik hospital launched a petition
before the final decision was made. Thus, the opposition
against the trust started early. Moreover, even though local
politicians no longer had any formal role in the decision-
making process, they soon began making their voices
heard at different venues, including an interpellation
debate in the Gjøvik local council. The local political par-
ties also put pressure on their representatives in parlia-
ment and the question quickly moved to the national
political arena. In the parliament's question time on the 5
November 2003, a local MP confronted the Minister of
Health with the restructuring plans and the minister sig-
naled that he would overrule the decision made by IHT to
move the maternity ward from Gjøvik to Lillehammer.
The Minister had probably made up his mind long before,
and he had already organized an extraordinary assembly
meeting for the Eastern Regional Health Authority on 6
November 2003. Here, he changed the previous decision.
The maternity ward in Gjøvik was to remain untouched.
In a press statement, the Ministry of Health acknowledged
that the previous decision of the IHT was in accordance
with national health political guidelines on the organiza-
tion of maternity care, but arguments relating to the
number of births in the existing ward were to be given
higher priority [35,36]. It would appear that there was lit-
tle or no opposition to this decision in parliament, as
pointed out by one MP in an interview:xii
I do not think that there was a single politician in the
Storting that thought this was right... The fear that this
could become a pattern was there, at least for me. I
hesitated a bit before saying that this should not hap-
pen, but still: This cannot take place all over the coun-
try! Then we would be making a mistake, and certainly
I could not face my voters and others in my county
and say that this was OK.
This particular MP clearly feared that this could become a
pattern and he would not support a similar case if it took
place in his county. This illustrates two important points.
First, the Innlandet Hospital Trust was one of the first
"tests" of the new organizational structure following the
hospital reform. Other trusts/reformers may have learned
from this process and reevaluated the potential for reform
in their own area. Second, this serves as an additional rea-
son for why no one opposed the protesters of Innlandet
and the MPs from Oppland. The decision by the Minister
of Health was in tune with the political preferences of the
majority in parliament and local protesters and politi-
cians.
In sum, this example from the first phase shows that the
new board managed to reach a decision but was unable to
implement it. The political protests were too loud to
ignore, as both the Minister of Health and the district MPs
quickly mobilized, and the Minister of Health decided to
overrule the decision made in the IHT. Clearly, IHT did
not have the degree of power over the issues that the for-
mal structure suggests. As a response to the intervention of
the Minister of Health, the chairperson of the IHT board
(a local business leader) decided to resign. In a local news-
paper, he commented on the Minister's intervention as
follows:
He is in his full right to overrule the board's decisions,
but this means that we are on our way back to the old
political model of governing [37].,
The second phase: The 2020 project
Health East RHA now appointed the deputy director of
the Health East RHA as the new chairperson of the IHT
board. Despite the turbulence experienced in the first
phase following the creation of the IHT, the trust's leader-
ship set out to develop a long-term investment plan
known as Project 2020 [38]. Having learned from Phase 1,
IHT chose to organize the process in this phase differently.
First, the process was to be open and inclusive. Second,
the trust invited politicians from the municipalities and
the counties to take part in a new political advisory group.
The process in Phase 1 showed the trust that actors in its
close environment had a considerable degree of control
over events that were crucial to them. The CEO of IHT
described the trust's experience thus far when he
addressed the new advisory group:
When specific cases reach the agenda the uproar starts.
We face three types of actors: the media - our own
employees - and the politicians. These three form alli-
ances that are more powerful then the trust's own alli-
ances with each of them. How can we form equally
strong alliances? [39],
The mayors of two of the municipalities, Hamar and
Stange, replied that forming this new advisory group
could be a wise first step towards achieving an alliance
[39].
One of the most important questions for the project was
the establishment of the main hospital in the region. Sig-
nals soon pointed to Hedmark as the county where the
main hospital would be sited. This made the conflict esca-
late once more and the trust faced criticism from a wide
array of actors, including politicians from all levels of gov-
ernment, employees, and other actors who had joined the
protests. The conflict escalated even further when the CEO
made it clear that it would be difficult to maintain currentBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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emergency capacity at all the units within the trust. A phy-
sician at the unit in Lillehammer (in the county of Opp-
land) illustrates how the trust's actions were interpreted:
Imagine that your neighbor, for all to see and without
anyone intervening, robs and steals the most valuable
items in your house. He does this easily and calmly
because it is perceived as "legal", and places them in
his own house. A few months later, he has the nerve
and indecency to invite you in to see how rational and
beautiful his house has become. At the same time, he
criticizes your house for its misery. THIS is what has
happened [40].,
This shows how emotional the conflict was and that the
trust's own employees shared the views of groups in the
organization's surroundings. Developments after the
ownership reform were seen as a process where the lead-
ership of the newly formed hospital trust deliberately
wanted to take from Oppland and give to Hedmark. This
was a formidable challenge for the trust. In one of the
meetings of the new advisory group, the CEO described
the situation in the following way:
We have heard the accusations that we want to put
everything in Hamar, we have even been called
"Hamar mobsters". Therefore, we have a need to be
seen as credible, to practice openness .... [41],
The relationship between the trust and the political actors
in its surrounding area was close to a warlike situation at
that time, with the CEO acknowledging that it was not
possible to administer the trust in such a situation. He
attempted to solve this problem by giving local and
regional politicians more influence in the decision-mak-
ing process [41]. However, this did not work and protests
escalated even further. For example, all of the MPs from
Oppland [42] wanted to divide IHT into two organiza-
tions, i.e., they wanted to return to the situation that pre-
ceded the formation of the IHT. Almost simultaneously,
the chief physicians of the hospitals located in Oppland
county signed a petition demanding resignation of IHT's
leadership. Even the central state's local representatives,
the county governors,xiii joined in. The state prefect in
Hedmark argued in a statement that:
It is necessary to gather the most specialized functions
so the patients in Innlandet can receive specialist care
of the same quality as patients elsewhere in the coun-
try. What is best for the patients must come before
political considerations [43].
The county governor from Oppland County viewed the
situation somewhat differently:
... a health care service that used to be very good is now
being dramatically reduced, and as many view it, to
the benefit of Hedmark. Important functions are now
being moved out of the county [43].
This phase also ended with a backlash against IHT. What
had started as a plan to discuss the hospital structure of
the whole region ended only with a discussion of a new
hospital structure for the Hamar-Elverum area. The CEO
of IHT summed up the plans in a newspaper interview in
May 2006:
The hospitals in Elverum and Hamar (read: in Hed-
mark) will become "twins" and function as a central
hospital for Hedmark. We no longer presuppose that
patients will need to cross the county boundaries in
order to receive care [44].
When asked by the journalist whether this meant they
were back where they started from several years ago, the
CEO replied:
It may seem that way for some, but I think the end
result of this process is an acceptable result both for
Hedmark and Oppland. We have a long way to go
before we can have one hospital for the entire region,
where all functions are gathered in one hospital. It
might also be the case that we will never see that hap-
pen [44].
Discussion
The question posed in this article was whether the 2002
hospital reform facilitated the restructuring of the hospital
sector. The case of the Innlandet Hospital Trust stands out
because it was the first large scale attempt to change struc-
tures after the change in ownership in 2002. Based on the
findings of the IHT case, it appears that the ownership
reform did not facilitate hospital restructuring. Whether
this reflects a more general pattern is an empirical ques-
tion. A single case study does not create a basis for empir-
ical generalization and we cannot, based on the findings
in this case study, conclude that the same factors are at
work in other reform processes. What is clear, however, is
that similar processes took place in other areas and that
local protest groups played key roles in other restructuring
processes [45-47]. Networks of politicians and others
were created, and a formal national network was formed,
with a focus on influencing national politicians and stop-
ping changes in local hospital services that involved
changes in emergency capacity [48]. Based on the find-
ings, two factors explain that restructuring of the hospital
sector may be as difficult as it was before the reform.
First, the actual policy process regarding local reforms is
far more complex than could be predicted by simplyBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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focusing on the formal delegation structure of the new
organizational model. During the first phase, the IHT
learned that local actors were influential and, as a direct
consequence, they reintroduced politics into the process
by creating a new arena for this purpose. The rationale for
this was clearly to trade influence in the decision-making
process against support, but this was insufficient for the
local actors. Based on the comments made by the leader-
ship of the trust, this was a forthright attempt to trade
influence against support. Another interpretation is that
the trust attempted cooptation [49]. Regardless of which
interpretation is correct, the attempt shows that the trust
acknowledged that they could not ignore local politicians.
Nevertheless, in order to be effective, this had to be attrac-
tive for local politicians, and this was not necessarily the
case. An interesting comment about the role and incen-
tives of local politicians was made by the chief editor of
one of the largest newspapers in the region following one
of the meetings of the new advisory committee for the
IHT:
They (the politicians) don't have to assume responsi-
bility, and they will blame you (the trust) no matter
what [39].
Thus, the trade-off of support vs. influence was never
attractive for local politicians. They never accepted the
trust's decisions regarding hospital structure, despite
increased involvement in the decision-making process. In
any case, the process described here shows that politicians
were not made redundant when the central state took over
ownership. Local politicians and other protesters created
an environment for the trust that made restructuring even
more difficult and could function as an important link to
politicians at the national level. Clearly, the trust did not
have the de facto power to reform the hospital structure in
the way they saw fit, despite having the de jure power to
do so. This observation is almost trivial, as studies of pol-
icy implementation [50,51] have provided similar
insights a number of times before. The growing literature
on governance [52-54] points in the same direction and is
premised on an understanding of the inability of central
states to govern. The central state has to take into account
the preferences and aims of multiple actors. In the IHT
case, local protest groups were formed and local and
regional politicians played an important role. Members of
parliament from the same district face the same incentives
as they are elected on the basis of votes in their county of
nomination. Standing firm in order to secure a possible
long-term benefit by improving the cost control and effi-
ciency of the hospital sector is probably of less value for
their local voters than engaging in, and supporting, local
protests. Thus attempting to "remove politics" in order to
increase decision making capacity may be futile, signifi-
cant local restructurings of the hospital sector are inher-
ently political issues.
The second factor relates to the vision of the national
goals of an efficient hospital sector spelled out in the
report from the royal commission that considered the
central government takeover of the hospitals [4]. How
clear is this vision, if at all? As discussed earlier, a problem
under county ownership was that the county politicians
had to balance local political considerations against the
national goals of an efficient hospital structure [4]. How-
ever, national politicians also need to balance these goals,
and there is no ex ante reason why their preferences
should differ from local and regional politicians. As
shown by Nerland [8], politicians at the national level
have actively reintroduced politics to many local reform
processes, and the involvement of MPs in local hospital
issues is far higher than predicted from the intentions of
the reform [55]. In the case of the maternity wards, the
ambiguity in the signals sent to the RHA becomes clear by
taking a closer look at the statements made during the
2003 budgets process. At the general level, the statements
are in favor of reform:
The majority in the committee, being members from
Labour, the Conservatives, the Progress party and the
Christian Democrats, means that there can be a need
for changes also in the local hospitals. Professional
deliberations may lead to necessary changes in mater-
nity care and emergency capacity. It is not politically
possible to appropriate oneself out of this need for
reforms. Parliament will then have to rely itself on the
advice given by important professional communities
such as the national board for maternity care [56].
In 2007, the members of the national advisory board for
maternity care, established to provide professional guid-
ance and advice in reforms relating to maternity wards,
left their posts in protest.xiv The leader of this group, Pro-
fessor Pål Øian at the maternity clinic in Tromsø, is
quoted as saying that:
The RHA started out with a clear mandate and a unan-
imous resolution from Parliament, but faced massive
resistance from local politicians, local media and local
professionals, and they received no signals from the
Ministry of Health and Care that they would receive
any support when implementing these resolutions
[57].
How clear the formal mandate given to the RHA actually
was is unclear. Formally, they could organize healthcare
services in the way they wanted, and were clearly expected
to do so in order to reduce costs [58], but just how far
these reforms could go was unclear. The Innlandet Hospi-BMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
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tal Trust represents one of the first major tests in this
respect. Similar challenges are also present in other areas/
trusts. The director of another trust, the Blefjell Hospital
Trust, argues that the trusts face a dilemma:
The demand for economic balance combined with
unwillingness to accept significant structural changes,
may lead to decreased quality. Either you have to fund
the existing hospital structure, or you have to accept
reforms [59].
In the case of the maternity ward at Gjøvik, the National
Board for Maternity Care had declared that the creation of
one maternity clinic in Lillehammer (which involved
shutting down the department in Gjøvik) was justified on
medical criteria. The total quality of the services available
for the population in Gjøvik would not necessarily
decrease if this proposal were implemented [35]. How-
ever, ultimately the Minister of Health decided that the
centralization of the maternity ward was not only a med-
ical and economic question but also one of geography
and redistribution, and therefore politics. As the minister
himself replied to a MP who wanted all decisions that
involved shutdowns to be handled by Parliament:
Whether or not something is of principal importance
will of course have to depend upon political consider-
ations (Answer to Olav Gunnar Ballo 24.01.2002, see
also [8], page 155)
The Minister of Health could rationalize his statement by
referring to the Hospital Trust Act of 2001 [7], where it
was declared that matters that were of a principal impor-
tance were to be presented to the Minster of Health. It is,
of course, difficult for local decision makers to know ex
ante what constitutes a matter of principal importance.
However, the combination of early intervention in the
case of Gjøvik and the ex post potential for the involve-
ment of politicians at all levels of government has lead to
ambiguity. The central state encouraged local restructur-
ing in order to reduce costs and thereby budget deficits in
the sector [58], but it did not accept the consequences.
Conclusion
Reforms such as the one that is described in this article are
inherently political. Voters pay attention to any changes
in the local hospital structure that may have (perceived or
real) negative effects on the services that are provided in
their area. Keeping politics at an arm's length may simply
be unrealistic and further complicate the politics of local
hospital reforms. However, it is important to emphasize
that this study does not provide grounds for empirical
generalization. We cannot, based on this study alone
know just how particular the process that is described and
analyzed here is. Whether the same type of mechanisms
that have been described in this article are relevant in sim-
ilar processes in other countries remains an open empiri-
cal question. This case study does however show that an
attempt to keep politics at arm's length in questions such
as these may be futile.
The Norwegian hospital reform of 2002 was an attempt to
simplify the organizational structure of the hospital sec-
tor. By gathering responsibility for all issues into one
hand, the central state, the general governing of the sector
was expected to improve. This case study indicates that the
reform paradoxically may have made the process more
complex. The combination of political interaction, both
on the vertical plane between political actors at different
levels and on the horizontal plane between political
actors and other actors outside the formal political arena,
created a highly complex political environment for the
hospital trusts. Local networks with politicians as their key
figures, in combination with employees and other actors,
demonstrated that they had more power over local devel-
opments in the hospital structure than the formal organi-
zational structure of the healthcare system suggested. At
the same time, politicians at the central level of govern-
ment were vulnerable to local protests and did not appear
to accept the consequences of their demand for balanced
budgets in the RHA.
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Appendix
i. This means that the Ministery of Health is not expected
to play an active role in steering the RHAs. The central
states channel for direct influence is in the enterprise
meeting, this enterprise meeting can be compared to a
general assembly in a limited company.
ii. The Stoltenberg I cabinet came into power on the 22
March 2000. However, at this time there were few or no
signals of the large reform in the hospital sector that were
to follow shortly after, although Stoltenberg stated that he
wanted to "renew" the public sector. A more detailed
description of the process behind the Norwegian hospital
reform can be found in the works of Nerland [8], Berg [9]
and Hagen and Kaarboe [10]
iii. Tjerbo and Hagen [11] provide a more elaborate dis-
cussion of these deficits and what caused them and is also
the source for figure 1.
iv. By visible, I mean policies that voters perceive as being
important. First, any negative effects of policies in this
area have the potential to be a matter of life and death.
Second, all voters know that they or someone near them
are likely to be in need of these services sometime in theBMC Health Services Research 2009, 9:212 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/9/212
Page 11 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
future. This is also an explanation of why local reforms
that alter traveling time and availability are controversial
and why equality of access is the key health political goal
in Norway. This is problematic in that the effects of any
proposed change on equality of access are not always
straightforward and the positive effects of other variables
may outweigh the negative effects. This is illustrated by
the proposed change in maternity services shown later in
the study.
v. In the bill that switched ownership, matters of "princi-
pal importance" are to be presented to the Minister of
Health. This means that extraordinary general assemblies
can be held when matters of a principal nature reach the
agenda. Just what exactly constitutes a matter of principal
importance, however, is not stated. Confer §30 in Ot.prp.
nr 66 (2000-2001).
vi. Some do however claim that this is a misunderstanding
and that generalization can be achieved also in case stud-
ies [29]. For a more in depth discussion of the case study
method see Yin [28], Stake [29], Flyvbjerg [30], Gerring
[31,32] and Lijphardt [33].
vii. The number of RHAs fell to four from 1 July 2007 with
the amalgamation of Health East RHA and Health South
RHA into Health South-East RHA.
viii. The correct number is eight if Sykehusapotekene ANS
(Hospital pharmacies ANS) is included.
ix. In 2002 (the first year after the reform), the hospitals
were preliminarily organized along county lines.
x. It is important to keep in mind that these local newspa-
pers can be seen as active participants in the process in
their own right. A somewhat similar argument applies
regarding the use of the internal information paper InnSi'a
(see reference no. 39). However, I do not see that this has
in any way lead to a biased depiction of the process that is
described here. I rely on several sources of information
and these local newspapers are primarily used as a source
of quotes from central actors.
xi. Personal interview with Finn Olav Rolijordet on 7
October 2004.
xii. This interview took place on 2 June 2005. The MP rep-
resents one of the largest opposition parties and was not
elected from Hedmark or Oppland.
xiii. The county governor is the central state representative
in the counties. He/she functions as a regulative authority
for the municipalities and as an organ to facilitate imple-
mentation of central state policies.
xiv. This protest was aimed at Sylvia Brustad, who was
Minister of Health at the time. The members of the
National Board for Maternity Care argued that the Minis-
try of Health and Social Care had ignored their advice and
hindered reorganization of the maternity care services.
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